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NOTES
IS CONTROL OF DEALER PARTICIPATION A
NECESSARY ADJUNCT TO REGULATION
OF INSTALLMENT SALES FINANCING?
Exorbitant charges have long been a serious abuse of installment
sales financing. In the early 1930's a rash of complaints about high
finance charges prompted state agencies to institute studies of consumer
financing.1 These surveys uncovered many factors which contributed
to imposition of excessive financing costs upon installment purchasers.2
One major element augmenting the finance charge was dealer partici-
pation.3 As a result of these investigations, two states attempted to
regulate both the finance charge and dealer participation ;4 eleven other
1. Complaints filed with the Wisconsin Interim Committee to Investigate Fi-
nance Companies are representative of those received by agencies of other states.
See REPORT OF THE STATE BANKING COMMISSION AND INTERIM ADvISORY LExis-
LATIVE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE FINANCE COMPANIES 65-89 (1935) (hereinafter
cited as WISCONSIN INTERIM REPORT). Both the Indiana Department of Financial
Institutions and the Better Business Bureau received with regularity complaints of high
installment sales financing charges. See REPORT OF INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ON INDIANA CONSUMER FINANCE AGENCIES 1 (1935) (hereinafter cited
as INDIANA REPORT).
2. Such practices of finance companies as refusing to refund the unearned portion
of the finance charge upon prepayment by consumers, imposing excessive additional
charges for delinquencies or repossessions, "finance kiting," and insurance misrepresen-
tations, serve to drive the finance charge upward. For explanation of these and other
methods of extracting higher payments from installment buyers, see WISCONSIN INTERIM
REPORT 33-49. More recently, other states have conducted the same sort of investigations.
with similar findings. See RETAIL INSTALLMENT SELLING, RESEARCH REPORT No. 6,
RESEARCH DISION, MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (1940) (hereinafter cited as
MARYLAND REPORT); INTERIM REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON IN-
STALLMENT FINANCING (New York) (1948).
For a complete bibliography of writings about installment sales financing, including
citations to all relevant state reports, see BARRETT AND ULRICH, LEGAL INDEX TO CON-
SUMER INSTALLMENT LENDING AND USURY 113-116 (1948).
3. Cavers, The Consnme'rs Stake in the Finance Company Code Controversy, 2
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 200, 210-212 (1935) ; see also INDIANA REPORT 45, n.1.
"Dealer participation" may be defined as that amount paid to a dealer by a pur-
chaser of installment contracts over and above the retail cash price of the item sold;
it manifests itself in several forms. The "dealer's reserve," for example, is the type
used by a finance company which purchases paper from a dealer on a repurchase agree-
ment whereby the dealer promises to buy back any items which the finance company
repossesses. The finance company establishes a reserve intended to absorb the dealer's
loss. This method is relied upon primarily by the large national companies. A "rebate,"
used mainly by the small companies, which purchase contracts on a non-recourse basis,
is a specific amount paid by the finance company to a dealer for each contract sold
td that finance company. A "pack" is that amount added by the dealer to the finance
charge specified by the finance company, and is retained by the dealer as profit. For
the best practical discussion of the part dealer participation plays in raising finance
charge, see WISCONSIN INTERIM REPORT 33-38.
4. The Indiana Retail Installment Sales Act expressly empowered the Department
of Financial Institutions to establish maximums. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-906, 58-910,
58-926 (Burns 1951). The Wisconsin State Banking Commission, under its authority
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states have since enacted installment sales legislation.5 Analysis of the
types of regulation adopted indicates the chaos prevailing in the area
today.
Some states rely entirely upon disclosure-type statutes to prevent
exorbitant finance charges by eliminating hidden contract provisions,
thereby acquainting consumers with the exact charges being imposed. 6
Others have established rigid limits upon this charge. Still other juris-
dictions have attacked the very roots of the dealer participation issue
by limiting dealer participation itself.8 Utah adopted the unique method
of subjecting the finance charge to its statutory usury limits.9 The
majority of courts, however, distinguish the purchase of items to be
paid for at a later time from simple money-borrowing, thus excluding
installment sales credit from the operation of usury statutes. 10 If the
problem began and ended with elimination of exorbitant finance charges,
perhaps it could be said that those states which merely limit the finance
charge have found the correct approach. But the very presence of discord
among the states indicates a much broader problem.
Although most of the states which have legislated in the area
attempt to curb abuses in installment sales of all consumer goods"
several confine their installment regulation to motor vehicle financing. 1 2
to revoke, suspend, or deny licenses on the grounds of unconscionable practices, has
established a maximum on dealer participation. Being without power to set rates, the
Commission requires the filing of rate charts, from which it determines the. industry
rate, and labels any rate above that average "unconscionable." Wis. STAT. § 218.01(3)
(11) (1951). For a complete discussion of the Wisconsin Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act, including a review of the manner in which the Banking Commission limits finance
charges and dealer participation, see Holz, The Regulation of Consumer Credit, 1943
Wis. L. REv. 449, 529-550.
5. California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Utah. See statutes collected in Note, 101 U. of PA. L.
REv. 530, 533, n.11 (1953).
6. E.g., N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 64a, 80b, 81.
7. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 619 (Purdon Supp. 1951).
8. Besides Indiana and Wisconsin (see note 4 supra), Ohio and Michigan have
enacted legislation placing upper limits on dealer participation. MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 23.628 (31) (c) (Supp 1951) ; OHlo GEN. CODE ANN. § 6346-22 (Supp. 1952).
9. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-2 (1953).
10. A continuing battle has been waged over judicial treatment of installment
credit in regard to the usury statutes. For a good presentation of the case for inclusion
of installment sales credit in usury regulation, see Berger, Usuery in Instailnent Sales,
2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 148 (1935); and see Ecker, Comnmentary on "Usury in
Installment Sales," 2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 173, criticizing Mr. Berger's position,
and supporting the position of the majority of the courts, who refuse to apply usury
statutes to installment sales credit.
11. Only the Massachusetts and Ohio statutes apply to all installment sales, regard-
less of dollar amount. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 255, §§ 11-13H (Supp. 1952) ; OH1o GEN.
CODE ANt. §§ 6346-15 to 27, 9589-5 (Supp. 1952). The other states, with the exception
of those regulating only automobile sales, place a limit upon the dollar value of sales
included in the coverage of their statute. E.g., N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAW § 64-a ($1500).
12. California, Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
NOTES
The automobile industry, with its assembly-line production depending
upon mass distribution, provokes abuses differing substantially from
those arising in diversified financing.13 Furthermore, the automobile
industry is most dependent upon sales financing-approximately one-
half of all retail installment sales financing stems from sales of motor
vehicles,' 4 and more than sixty per cent of retail auto sales are handled
through installment-plan instruments. 15 An analysis of this industry
clearly underlines the complications implicit in the control of installment
sales financing and the regulation of dealer participation.
In order to retain some degree of liquidity, automobile dealers sell
their installment paper for the cash price of the item sold; the purchaser
of the paper collects from the consumer and imposes a finance charge
upon the transaction.16 Although commercial banks purchase some dealer
paper, the most important outlets for these contracts are sales finance
companies.' 7  Every finance company issues rate charts to the dealers
13. One major difference between automobile and diversified financing is in the
bases upon which contracts are purchased by finance companies. Most installment sales
contracts of items such as electrical appliances and furniture are sold by dealers on a
recourse basis; dealer reserves are in common use and the pack is not a major problem.
Furthermore, far more manufacturers are involved in diversified financing, but none
conducts a business as large as Chrysler, Ford, or General Motors, who comprise the
Big Three of motor vehicle manufacturing. For a description of the competitive situa-
tion in diversified financing, see PLU MER AND YOUNG, SALES FINANCE COMPANIES
AND THEIR CREDIT PRACcICEs 283-85 (1940).
14. Over the ten-year period from 1929-1938, automobile installment credit aver-
aged 51.6% of all installment sales credit. Furniture store installment credit ran an
outdistanced second with an average of 15.5%o of total installment sales credit. These
figures are extracted from data in MARYLAND REPORT 11, Table 5.
15. FTC REPORT oN MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 920 (1940) (hereinafter cited
as FTC REPORT).
Installment sales credit played a vital role as a catalytic agent in the mass dis-
tribution of assembly-line manufactures. Especially in the production of automobiles
did it serve a valuable function. Commercial banks shied away from installment
financing in untried industries such as automobile manufacturing; finance companies
filled the breach. For a panoramic view of sales financing through the years, including
a discussion of its importance to the automobile industry, see PHELPS, THE RoLE OF
THE SALES FINANCE COMPANIES IN THE AmERICAN ECONOMY (1952), published by
and supplied to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL by Commercial Credit Company, Balti-
more, Md.
16. PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. suprG note 13, at 36.
17. Finance companies have proven a necessity to automobile retail dealers. In
1937 approximately 60% of total automobile sales were made on the installment
plan; of these, dealers financed only a small portion themselves, while of the large
remainder, 96% was handled "by finance companies with only 4% going to commercial
and small-loan banks. FTC REPoRT 920-923. Since then, the proportion received by
banks has grown rapidly, until, in February, 1953, banks purchased more than 20%
of all installment paper originating with automobile dealers. Cox, THE EcoNoMIcs
OF INSTALLMENT BUYING 340 (1948); see also REviSION OF CONSUMER CREDIT STA-
TISTICS, Fan. RES. BULL. 336, 351-53, Tables 4, 5, 6 (April 1953). Since manufacturers
demand cash for automobiles delivered to retailers, the finance companies step in with
ready cash to finance the dealers' requirements-the "floor plan"--to the extent that
today they provide from 90 to 100% of cash required by retailers for this purpose.
The Wisconsin Interim Committee cited as an evil of installment sales financing
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from whom that company purchases paper, specifying the finance charge
which is to be added to the cash price. i s
Theoretically, finance companies appear to have three methods by
which to obtain dealer business. Utilization of all three by any one
company should assure an advantageous competitive position. The first
and foremost of these is dealer participation.'9 Since the dealer is pri-
marily interested in profiting from automobile sales, the finance com-
pany offering him the highest participation which will not decrease his
an unfair trade practice concerned with floor plan financing. This type of financing
i3 rendered primarily as a service to the dealer, with a very small interest charge.
"The evil of floor plan financing is the general tendency to coerce dealer into financing
sales through the finance company who does the floor planning." This deprives the
consumer of an opportunity to choose his own finance company, and may be a factor
in lessening competition or creating a monopoly in favor of the large national com-
panies. WIsCoNsIN INTERIM REPORT 38-39.
18. PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 197. Some unscrupulous
finance companies furnish dealers with more than one rate chart, one specifying the
amount the company demands, and another to show the customer, indicating the charge
to him; the difference is kept by the retailer as his "pack"-the consumer, of course,
believes the total charge to him is that called for by the finance company. XVIscoNsIN
INTERIM REPORT 36.
"[Placking-the term for that part of the finance charge which exceeds the amount
called for by a rate chart-is amost universally condemned as unethical." Mors, Statc
Regulation of Installment Financing-Progress and Problems II, 24 J. Bus. oF U. OF
CHI. 43 (1951). Mr. Mors makes the point that "[c]ompetition is virtually helpless in
eliminating packing. . . ." because (1) ". . . consumer demand for installment credit
is inelastic with respect to changes in interest (or finance-charge) rates .. " and (2)
".. . retail dealer demand for credit is elastic. . . ." with respect to the participation
allowed by finance companies. Id. at 44. Although his second contention seems valid,
the first one may be questioned. Evidence that many more buyers have financed their
purchases through installment loans in recent years indicates that buyers are becoming
more and more aware that commercial banks, through installment lending, may provide
their cheapest method of financing; in other words, demand for consumer credit may
be inelastic, but it is flexible for any particular type of consumer credit, such as install-
ment credit. Until 1943, installment sales credit was by far the most important source
of consumer credit. In that year, installment loans took the lead, and by 1947, the
volume of sales credit outstanding approximated only three-fifths of the loan credit
outstanding. Cox, op. cit. supra note 17, at 485-489, Table B-3. Although in 1948 and
1949, installment credit recaptured the lead, installment lending was in a much stronger
position than at any time before 1943. Legis., 63 HARv. L. REV. 874 (1950).
In 1935, General Motors Acceptance Corporation instituted its "6% Plan," which
sought to teach the public to compute finance charges. The FTC issued a "cease and
desist" order, thus halting this program on the grounds of deceptive advertising. How-
ever, the Commission declared that this plan, if comprehended by prospective pur-
chasers, would enable them to detect any overcharge or pack. PLUMMER AND YOUNG,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 201-203. Since consumer demand for credit appears to be flexible,
perhaps education of the public by statewide or nationwide advertising campaigns,
sponsored by government agencies or Better Business Bureaus, would help to eliminate
the dealer's pack. Or perhaps disclosure-type statutes, making the contract terms and
charges succinct and concise, will rid installment sales financing of the increment called
"pack." See N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 64-a, which prescribes the types of information
to be disclosed.
19. "Today, when a dealer makes arrangements to finance his paper, his first
question is, 'How much do I get and when do I get it?'" WISCONSIN INTERIm REPORT
35.
NOTES
sales will probably win his business.20 The dealer may lose customers
because of increased participation if the finance company which supplies
him with rate charts demands a high finance charge. 21 Therefore, coup-
ling a high kickback with low finance charges will lure many dealers.
Competition for the dealer's business is also affected by the degree of
risk which will be accepted on the paper, so that a finance company may
be forced to purchase some comparatively high-risk paper as an aid
to the dealer's auto sales in order to obtain his desirable paper. 22 Under
perfect competitive conditions, these factors should determine which
company will handle the largest amount of installment contracts, but
what applies in theory does not always rule in actuality.
Although more than five hundred companies purchase automobile
installment paper, 23 three of these firms, General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, and Commer-
cial Credit Company, purchase about seventy per cent of all installment
paper sold by dealers to finance companies. 24 These enterprises, often
referred to as the Big Three, differ from the smaller companies in that
each of them can attribute its growth to tremendous size to its kinship
with one of the Big Three of automobile manufacturing.2 5
20. Moralists might state the proposition that "the sincere businessman will not
gouge the consumer, but will accept a reasonable profit from the sale of goods and
be proud of the service he has rendered 1o his community." This premise may be
questioned even under inflationary business conditions, but when automobiles are hard
to sell, the dealer must, for his own sake, appreciate the presence of the "little extra"
which may carry him safely through a depression. Cavers, suepra note 3, at 211.
That "little extra" can be a very large item to the dealer. Assume the sale of a
$2000 automobile, with $500 down payment. A 6% finance charge on the $1500 unpaid
balance amounts to $90. If the dealer receives a 2% participation, his kickback is $30.
An FTC study disclosed an average gross profit of under 17% for dealers, with a net
average of less than 2%. FTC REoRT 875-876. Giving the dealer the benefit of doubt
in accord with the inflationary conditions existing today, assume a 25% gross, 5% net.
His dollar gross on that auto would then be $500, his net $100. The $30 kickback
amounts to 30%o of his net profit on the sale of the auto, and his profit from both
the sale and the financing transactions is $130.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. This factor has become virtually stable, since finance companies seldom refuse
paper offered them by dealers. This may be attributed to two factors: (1) dealers
have learned to refuse poor risks, and (2) the competitive situation requires each
company to accept even that paper whose terms are out of line with those that ar
customary. PLUMTMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 107.
23. The exact number of individual sales finance companies operating in the United
States has long been a mystery. 1Ihe National Association of Finance Companies
and the Census of Business have made estimates ranging from about 1,000 to 2,300.
Id. at 34. The FTC estimated that about 500 sales finance companies are engaged in
financing the distribution of motor vehicles. FTC REPORT 921.
24. A survey of 424 sales finance companies disclosed that these three companies,
classified as factory-related in the survey, supplied 67.66% of retail credit, and 78.70%
of wholesale credit extended by sales finance companies to dealers in 1937. PLUa!MER
AND YOUNG.. op. cit. supra note 13, at 264, Table 67.
25. For discussion of the part played by the manufacturers in the growth of
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That the augmentation of General Motors auto sales is a distinctive
objective of the competitive policy of GMAC, the only completely factory-
controlled finance company,2 6 is indicated by the fact that its services are
available only to GM dealers 2' to whom it extends low cost financing
facilities. 28 This unique policy has been an important factor in reducing
the finance charge to consumers, since other companies were forced to
lower their finance charges in order to compete with GMAC. 9
The participation, primarily in the form of dealer reserve, offered
by GMAC to its dealers has always been as low as or lower than that
extended by its competitors, 30 yet GMAC has always managed to receive
almost all GM dealers' paper.31  Evidence of coercion upon dealers
prompted a government anti-trust action against General Motors, which
resulted in a consent decree enjoining GM from compelling its dealers
to sell all of their installment paper to GMAC.32 Although Ford and
the Big Three of installment financing, see Id. at 261-275. On an average, each of the
Big Three, in 1937, received about twelve hundred times as much automobile dealer
business as the average for each of the small companies. Id. at 263.
26. FTC REPORT 922. For a number of years Chrysler Corporation owned 55,000
shares of stock in CCC; it has since released all ownership interest. Ford Motor
Company formed Universal Credit Corporation in 1928, and in 1933 sold its proprietary
interest to Commercial Investment Trust Corporation. Ibid. See also GRIMES, THE
STORY OF COMMERCIAL CarT COMPANY 59-60 (1946).
27. PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 269.
28. In order to enable dealers to pay cash before shipment of motor vehicles,
GMAC finances floor plans of these dealers, at little or no profit to it; the purpose
is to facilitate a large turnover of automobiles by dealers. To aid the consumer public
in buying cars in volume, GMAC extends low cost credit to installment buyers. Gen-
eral Motors, realizing that sharp practices and high finance charges by finance com-
panies and dealers reflect on automobile sales volume, has attempted to prevent these
practices through the efforts of its own finance company. FTC REPo RT 941, 944.
29. The perfect example of the influence GMAC's price policies have upon the
whole industry is that company's initiation of its "6-percent plan." See note 18
supra. In 1935, GM and GMAC announced and advertised their new program. Before
comencement of this plan, GMAC finance charges averaged 87o on one-year install-
ment contracts. This program reduced them to 6%. Shortly thereafter, other manu-
facturers instituted similar plans for their preferred finance companies, thus reducing
their rates. By the time the FTC issued a "cease and desist" order against the "6-per-
cent plan," GMAC had made substantial gains. FTC REPoRT 941-945. In 1936,
GMAC's volume of obligations purchased increased more than two hundred million
dollars, larger than any former increase from one year to the next. Whether this is
directly attributable to GM.AC's "6-percent plan" may be questioned, but some sig-
nificance may be attached to that increase in respect to GMAC's new program. Id. at
935, Table 151.
30. A 1938 study disclosed, for example, that GMAC allowed an average kick-
back on 12-month installment contracts of 1.2 percent, while CIT and CCC averaged
1.86, and the independent finance companies offered kickbacks averaging 1.65. Id. at
959, Table 160.
31. "'GMAC finances approximately 65% of the General Motors cars sold to
dealers on time and around 75% of the cars sold to retail purchasers on time." United
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 391 (7th Cir. 1941).
32. Independent finance companies instigated the movement that resulted in the
indictment in 1938 of both the Big Three of automobile manufacturing and the Big
646
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Chrysler had disposed of all proprietary interests in CIT and CCC
respectively,33 similar actions were instituted against these companies to
enjoin them from certain coercive acts they had committed in favor of
these finance companies which they were now related to only by agree-
ment;34 these companies, however, averted litigation by signing consent
decrees.35 The manufacturers' coercive practices had played a major
role in enabling the related finance companies to secure dealer business;
since the decrees allow the automobile manufacturers to take certain
steps short of actual coercion and discrimination, it may be naive to
believe that these decrees have deprived the factories of all their dealer
control. 36
Even if the consent decree were completely successful, GMAC has
other effective weapons which it can and does use without sacrificing
Three of automobile financing. FTC REPORT 935. General Motors elected to defend
against the charge, under the Sherman Act, of "conspiracy in restraint of trade."
General Motors was accused of such practices as: (1) requiring a promise to use
GMAC services as a condition for receiving a GM franchise; (2) discriminating
against GM dealers not using GMAC, by refusing to deliver cars; (3) giving favors
to dealers using GMAC. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th
Cir. 1941). Finally, in 1952, the case against General Motors was concluded with
entry of the consent decree. United States v. General Motors Corp., CCH TRADE
REG. RE,. (9th ed.) 167,324 (S.D. Ill. 1952).
33. See note 26 supra.
34. The indictments against Ford and Chrysler and their related finance com-
panies were nol-prossed on November 15, 1938, upon the entry of consent decrees by
them. For an excellent discussion of the consent decrees, see Birnbaum, The Auto-
Finance Consent Decree: A New Technique in Enforcing the Sherman Act, 24 WASH.
U.L.Q. 525 (1939).
35. One important provision restrained the manufacturers from acquiring owner-
ship interests in finance companies. Because it would be inequitable to bind Ford and
Chrysler and allow GMAC to continue its coercive practices, the decree provided that
if, by January 1, 1941, a final decree were not entered requiring GM to divest itself
of all ownership and control of GMAC, the court would modify the present decrees
to allow the manufacturers to acquire holdings in finance companies. Haberman and
Birnbaum, The Auto-Finance Consent Decree, An Epilogue, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 46.
The General Motors case rode the trail of appeal until 1952. Year after year,
Ford consented to an extension of its consent decree, until 1945, when it asked relief.
The Supreme Court finally, in 1948, released Ford from the restraints upon it. Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948). It is unlikely that Ford will revert
to its coercive practices of pre-consent decree days, since ". . . [t]he lifting of the
restraints imposed by the consent decree does not, of course, affect the liability of Ford
for any violations of the Sherman Law that the Government may establish in
court. . . ." Id at 320.
The consent decree finally entered against General Motors resembles the two
earlier decrees against the other manufacturers; however, General Motors is not
required to dispose of proprietary interests in GMAC. United States v. General Motors
Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed.) 67.324 (S.D. Ill. 1952).
36. The General Motors decree, for example, allows that company to: (a) adopt
plans of financing sales; (b) recommend such plans to dealers; (c) advertise these
plans to the public; (d) mention GMAC in institutional advertising; and (e) advertise
GMAC in connection with sales made by factory owned retail stores. United States
v. General Motors Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed.) 67,324-5 (S.D. Ill. 1952).
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its ultimate objective of keeping costs low to the consumer. To enhance
their security interest in the autos financed, dealers and finance companies
usually require installment buyers to purchase certain types of insurance.37
GMAC encourages dealing with General Exchange Insurance Corpora-
tion and Motors Insurance Corporation, both owned by GMAC.38 The
rates which these two corporations file with state insurance commissions
average twenty-five per cent lower than manual rates.3 9 Although an
estimated eighty per cent of the total volume of insurance premiums
from installment sales transactions flows through insurance companies
owned and controlled entirely by finance companies, only the GMAC-
owned companies offer this saving to the consumer. 40 In states in which
auto dealers may easily qualify as insurance agents, Motors Insurance
Corporation's rates are manual and the twenty-five per cent is rebated
to the dealer as commission on the insurance. 41 The public still benefits
in these states, however, in that the saving which is made in other states
from low insurance rates manifests itself in the form of reduced finance
charges. 42
37. 'Insurance misrepresentations have long been a major abuse in sales financing.
Dealers ordinarily require installment buyers to purchase property damage, theft, and
collision insurance. Since the dealer usually secures the insurance for the purchaser,
the charge is included in the installment contract. Not infrequently does the buyer
later discover that he has received insurance with a lesser value than that for which
he has paid. Mors, State Regulation of Retail Installment Financing-Progress and
Problems, 23 J. Bus. OF U. OF CmI. 211 (1950); WISCONSIN INTERIM REPORT 47.
Contract disclosure provisions of installment legislation usually require itemization of
all charges, including insurance, thus allowing purchasers to protect themseves against
insurance misrepresentations. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-9044 (Burns 1951).
38. PLUMMER. AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 269.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. The practice of rebating insurance commissions to dealers has presented a
problem in Wisconsin and Indiana. In Wisconsin, GMAC asked for a declaratory
judgment of invalidity of that rule of the State Banking Commission defining dealer
participation as including any amount retained by the dealer which was collected from
an automobile buyer, including insurance commissions. The court looked through the
corporate veil to see that GMAC owns Motors Insurance Corporation, and held that
any insurance commission rebated is an element of dealer participation, and therefore,
that the totals of any reserves or rebates plus insurance commissions could not legally
rise above the two percent established maximum. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Comm'r of Banks, 258 Wis. 56, 45 N.W.2d 83 (1950), rehearing denied, 46 N.W.2d
328 (1951).
An Indiana automobile dealer sued the Department of Financial Institutions to en-
join enforcement of a general order disallowing any participation on a sale in which the
dealer receives an insurance commission. The Supreme Court held this order to be an
arbitrary invasion of private property under the guise of the police power. Department of
Financial Institutions v. Johnson Chevrolet Co., 228 Ind. 397, 92 N.E.2d 714 (1950).
42. PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 269.
In addition, GMAC maintains liberal credit policies to augment GM dealers'
auto sales, although extremely bad-risk paper is discouraged and often refused by
GMAC. While General Motors coerced dealers to use the services of GMAC, many
dealers were refused financing by this company if their financial condition was unsound.
NOTES 649
While CIT and CCC both maintain insurance company connec-
tions, neither rebates insurance commissions to the retail dealer nor
secures lower insurance rates for the public. 43  However, these com-
panies have followed GMAC's price policies very closely, and so have
maintained their finance charges at a low level.44 The major difference
in operating procedure between these two companies and GMAC is that,
while GIAC maintains a low-level dealer reserve, CIT and CCC seem
to channel their competitive efforts into increased dealer participation.4 5
Furthermore, the large companies have diversified their investments,
directing their resources into many profitable businesses;46 the small
companies have always had to rely upon installment sale financing as a
primary source of profit.47
Despite the fact that dealer participation is an obvious increment
to the finance charge4" and a powerful, oft-abused competitive weapon
Furthermore, while dealers were compelled to sell installment paper to GMAC to the
exclusion of all other finance companies, many prospective customers were declared
ineligible under GMAC terms. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376,
389, 399 (7th Cir. 1941).
43. "Many other sales finance companies own their own insurance companies ...
but the general practice is to quote only manual rates. Thus the other finance com-
panies . .. must offset the disadvantage .. " PLUMMFR AND YOUNG, op. Cit. supra
note 13, at 269.
44. A study of selected finance companies for the years 1935-38 indicates that the
national companies consistently maintained lower finance charges than the smaller com-
panies. For example, in 1938, GMAC averaged, on twelve-month contracts, a finance
charge of 6.1%, CIT and CCC averaged 6.4%, and the smaller companies averaged
6.89o. Id. at 211, Table 55.
45. A 1938 study disclosed that CIT and CCC offered participations larger than
either GMAC or the independent companies. See note 30 supra. More conclusive
evidence of the larger companies' eagerness to elevate kickbacks in order to secure dealer
business is CIT's admission that, prior to the case of Department of Financial Institu-
tions v. Holt, which contested Indiana's dealer participation limitation, CIT had con-
tracted with certain dealers to raise the amount of participation if the Holt decision
legalized higher participations. Brief for Appellees, p. 10, Department of Financial Institu-
tions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. 1952).
46. Both CCC and CIT have acquired holdings in many profit-making businesses.
CCC, for example, provides five types of financing services, owns insurance companies
supplying three kinds of insurance services, and operates manufacturing companies in
eight different fields. See PHELPS, op. cit. suprt note 15, at 85-86; C.LT., Fortune,
Sept., 1947, p. 86.
47. Finance companies have three main sources of income: interest from whole-
sale financing; finance charges from retail financing; insurance commissions received
from placing consumers' insurance with certain insurance companies. FTC REPORT 946.
GMAC owns its own insurance companies. CIT and CCC have investments in insurance
and manufacturing companies. Small companies though, are not able to acquire such
dispersed holdings, and so have not received substantial profits from sources other than
the three listed above.
48. Under the guidance of the National Recovery Administration, all finance com-
panies met to compile a code of practice for the industry. Twice they convened and
twice the meeting ended in failure, because of differences over dealer participation.
The small companies seemed to favor outright abolition of any form of participation,
claiming they were "commercial bribery." The Big Three wanted the reserve retained,
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in the automobile industry, only four states have attempted to control
it.49  Only in Indiana has the constitutionality of dealer participation
regulation been tested in court.50 An action is now pending in Wisconsin
which will test the validity of its method of limiting kickbacks. 51
The Indiana Retail Installment Sales Act 52 established a Depart-
ment of Financial Institutions, which was empowered to promulgate
both maximum finance charges 53 and maximum allowable dealer partici-
pation.5" But, in 1952, the Indiana Supreme Court wrote finis to In-
and packs and bonuses eliminated, asserting that the reserve merely protected the dealers
from losses, but evidence showed that the reserve was often excessive, and, therefore,
a source of unearned profit to the dealers. Cavers, op. cit. supra note 3. Mr. Cavers
points out that, in the depression, ". . . many dealers would have gone to the wall. .. ."
had it not been for the income derived from participation. Id. at 211. But is it proper,
when the dealer renders no services, to reimburse him out of the finance charge paid
by the consumers? The Michigan legislature thought not when, in 1950, it declared
illegal any participation paid, unless in return for services; when paid for services, any
amount over two percent is illegal. MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 23.628(31) (c) (Supp. 1951).
The services referred to in that statute specifically include only those rendered in pre-
paring ". . . the credit information, contract, note, mortgage and application for title...."
An analogy may be drawn between the retail dealer and a middleman in any other
industry. The job of middleman, such as a broker, is to secure customers, and the
middleman is reimbursed for his services. If the dealer is likened to a middleman for
securing credit customers, he may be entitled to compensation for these services to the
finance company. Continuing the comparison, the kickback may then be likened to
the broker's commission. If this analogy is proper, a reasonable amount of participa-
tion is easily justifiable.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. 1952), de-
clared Indiana's dealer participation regulation unconstitutional.
51. "I do believe that we have a better chance of winning the test case that is
pending in Wisconsin on the constitutionality of the Rules and Regulations of this
department relating to dealer participation than we would . . . under Indiana's law.
[T]he major objection raised by the dealers [is] that if it is unconstitu-
tional to regulate dealer participation in Indiana, the Wisconsin regulation is uncon-
stitutional." Communication to the INrANA LAW JouRNAL from John F. Doyle,
Supervisor, Consumer Credit Division, Wisconsin State Banking Department.
52. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-901 through 58-934 (Burns 1951).
53. Under the authority granted by § 26 of the Retail Installment Sales Act, the
Department is empowered to classify retail installment sales arising from retail install-
ment contracts, and to fix by general order the fair maximum finance charge in each
class. Class I includes new motor vehicles, airplanes, trailers, tractors, and motorcycles;
Class II includes used motor vehicles, airplanes, etc., less than two years old; Class III
includes the used vehicles in Class II, if more than two years old; Class IV includes
all other goods. The maximum set for each class is comprised of a sum equal to a
stated percentage of the unpaid balance, in effect a discount, plus an amount equal to
simple interest at a stipulated rate per month on the declining unpaid balance. The
discount for Class I is 2%o, Class II, 3%, Class III, 5%, and Class IV, 2%. The
simple interest rate used is 1'4%, 1.8757, 2.3%, and 1.875% for the four classes
respectively. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-906, 58-926 (Burns 1951), and Rule 58-926-1 there-
under, see HonAcx, 2 IND. Apmixs. CoD, 4403 (1941). For a comparison between
Indiana's method of computing the maximum finance charge and those of California,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, with a discussion of the merits of each method, see Mors,
spra note 18, at 49-57.
54. The maximum allowable dealer participation established under the authority
NOTES
diana's method of limiting dealer participation; in Department of Finan-
cial institutions v. Holt,55 the court characterized that portion of the Act
which authorized rebate regulation as an arbitrary invasion of property
rights under the guise of protecting the public interest by use of the
police powver. Universal CIT Credit Corporation56 intervened on behalf
of the plaintiff, an automobile dealer, who was seeking to enjoin enforce-
ment of the dealer participation limitation, claiming that the buying
public is fully protected against unfair and exorbitant finance charges
by the maximum placed upon finance charges. The Department insisted
that the regulation does operate in the public interest, sufficiently so to
justify its imposition. The court agreed with the plaintiff that dealer
participation regulation was a form of legislative price-fixing, and there-
fore was governed by its earlier decisions on price-fixing statutes. 57
Applying the principles of substantive due process,-5 the court declared
of § 10 was adapted to the finance charge classification. For Class I, the maximum
was 2%, Class II, 3%, Class III, 5%, Class IV, 2%. IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-910 (Burns
1951), and Rule 58-926-1 thereunder, see HoRAcic, 2 IND. ADMIN. CODE 4403 (1941).
55. 108 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. 1952). A source of wonderment is the fact that the
dealer participation limitation was not contested earlier. Possibly, dealers and finance
companies had no idea that such a regulation might be declared unconstitutional. Their
cue to test its validity may have come from the gratuitous dicta rendered by the Supreme
Court in the Johnson Chevrolet case. That case concerned a prohibition against a
dealer receiving a commission on insurance sold in connection with an installment con-
tract. See note 41 supra. The Court indicated how it would treat a future action test-
ing dealer participation regulation with these words: " . . . The cost to. the retail
buyer cannot be affected, because both the finance charges and the insurance rates are
controlled. . . . Whether or not dealer's participation is paid would not affect the cost
to the retail buyer. . . ." Department of Financial Institutions v. Johnson Chevrolet
Co., 228 Ind. 397, 406, 92 N.E.2d 714, 717 (1950).
56. An Indiana corporation, and a subsidiary of CIT.
57. The court admitted that it has "consistently refused to follow the 'pattern' or
'drift' apparent in the decisions of other courts which approve mere legislative price-
fixing." Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, (Ind. 1952). To
illustrate its point, the court cited the following cases in which the Indiana Supreme
Court had struck down price- or wage-fixing legislation: Street v. Varney Electrical
Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N.E. 895 (1903); State Board of Barber Examiners v.
Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972 (1942); Kirtley v. State, 227 Ind. 175, 84 N.E.2d
712 (1949).
The Kirtley case placed reliance squarely upon Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928), which is "dead for federal constitutional purposes." FRANK, CASES ON COX-
sTiTUTioNAL LAiw 690 (1952). The United States Supreme Court would probably
uphold the constitutionality of legislation similar to that questioned in the Holt case
". .. [C]ourts may not declare a legislative judgment invalid unless, viewed in the
light of facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to pre-
clude the assumption that the classification rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators." Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935). The presumption of constitutionality accorded
price-fixing legislation in the United States Supreme Court is best illustrated by United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
As a result of these cases, substantive due process is virtually a "dead letter" in
the United States Supreme Court, although some state courts prize it dearly.
58. Paulsen, "Natural Rights"-A Constitutional Doctrine in Indiana, 25 IND. L.J.
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that the means of regulation were not "reasonably related to the purpose
sought to be accomplished."' 5
The Department placed equally-distributed emphasis upon two con-
tentions.60 First, it predicted that delimitation would adversely affect
the public. In fixing a fair maximum finance charge, the Department bases
its determination upon what it considers to be the fair cost of conducting
the sales finance business, including amounts paid for installment con-
tracts as an item of cost.6 ' The Department therefore contended, with
seemingly sufficient evidence, that with removal of dealer participation
limits, the big companies will bid for dealer business by offering larger
participations.62  The higher prices paid for paper will then reflect as
an item of cost which the Department must recognize, the Department
will have to raise the finance charge maximum, and as the maximum
increases, actual finance charges will follow this upward trend. In reject-
ing this assertion, the court pointed out that the Department can resist
any pressures to raise the maximum if it does not consider a larger
participation a legitimate item of cost.
Secondly, the Department contended that the nationals, financially
stronger, can corner the installment paper market by outbidding the
small companies, and thereby destroy them. The court asserted in
answer that Section 10 had no anti-monopolistic purposes, although other
sections of the act admittedly do.6 3 The court found no reason to believe
that if monopoly or oligopoly ever seems imminent, and existing anti-
trust legislation fails to remedy the situation, the legislature would not
act to solve the problem.
The Department, in arguing that the nationals would request an
increased maximum finance charge, neglected to mention that the locals
would inevitably be forced to raise their kickbacks to retain the dealer
business they now hold, and certainly to acquire additional customers.6 4
123 (1950); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34
MINN. L. REv. 92 (1950).
59. Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 635 (Ind. 1952).
60. Id. at 636.
61. "The Department, in determining the fair maximum finance charge .. . shall
take into consideration ... the finance charge which will be necessary in order to induce
sufficient amounts of efficiently operated capital to enter into the business of making
and purchasing retail installment contracts." InD. ANN. STAT. § 58-926 (Bums 1951)
(emphasis added). "In fixing a fair maximum finance charge the Department can
determine what the fair cost of conducting the business of licensees ought to be, includ-
ing the amounts paid for these contracts as an item of costs.. . ." Department of Financial
Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. 1952).
62. See note 46 supra.
63. Section 21 of the Act prohibits contracts to prevent competition, Sections 22
and 23 prohibit coercive practices tending to prevent competition, and Section 24 makes
illegal subsidies paid by manufacturer to licensees if those subsidies tend to lessen or
eliminate competition. InD. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-921, 58-922, 58-923, 58-924 (Bums 1951).
64. As indicated by CIT's planned program of increased participations upon a
NOTES 653
It is reasonable to assume, in light of the Big Three's long-range low-
charge policy, that they would probably maintain low financing costs
as long as possible.6 5 On the other hand, the small companies, perhaps
both unwilling and unable to accept a smaller profit on the finance charge,
may elevate the finance charge correspondingly with the increase in
participation.66
In either event, it is unlikely that the Department could resist the
pressure for a change placed upon it by companies financing a substantial
segment of all installment sales. 67  It hardly seems possible that the
Department must grant increases ad infinitum, but with the very first
increase the consumer will have been damaged.
The very heart of the Indiana Act would be endangered by the
Department's refusal to grant an increase. The group denied an increase
probably would sue the Department to enjoin enforcement of the maxi-
mum finance charge limitation, as a violation of its liberty to contract.68
As evidenced by the Holt case, the Indiana Supreme Court adheres to
the principles of substantive due process.69 It is conceivable that the
court would treat the finance charge as a price of services and the regula-
tion as a type of price-fixing legislation; the court may then strike the
maximum finance charge down as unconstitutional. 70  Thus, by causal
declaration of invalidity of § 58-910 of the Indiana Retail Installment Sales Act. dealer
participation is the most successful method of securing dealer business. See note 19
supra. Unquestionably, dealers welcome, and often demand, that item of profit. See
note 20 supra.
65. See note 29 supra. High finance charges have been a factor in the increased
volume of installment lending; furthermore, high charges will drive automobile cus-
tomers away from dealers doing business with companies demanding these high rates.
See note 18 supra.
66. A study of selected sales finance companies for the years 1928-39 disclosed
that the national companies annually received a larger proportion of net profits to gross
income, and, conversely, incurred a smaller percentage of expenses, than local com-
panies. In 1939, for example, the nationals showed a 30.5% net profit on gross income,
while the locals netted 22.6% of gross income. PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 251, Table 64.
Assuming those figures to represent the existing situation, obviously any simul-
taneous increase in the cost to the nationals and the locals of purchasing contracts would
reduce profits of both. The net profits of the locals would decrease to the point of
bearing a loss sooner than the profits of the nationals. Therefore, a likely step by the
small companies would be to increase a source of profit, probably the finance charge.
67. In determining a fair maximum finance charge, the Department must also
take into consideration the "finance charge which will be necessary in order to induce
sufficient amounts of efficiently operated commercial capital to enter into the business."
Investors will not enter a field when the origination of a new enterprise is extremely
risky. IND. ANN. STAT. § 5 8-926(c) (Burns 1951).
68. This contention would be similar to the one asserted by the plaintiffs in the
Holt case. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that the dealer participation regulation
interfered with their right to sell contracts at a price determined by them. Brief for
Appellees, p. 12, Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629 (Ind.
1952).
69. See notes 57 and 58 supra.
70. See note 57 upra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
sequence, Indiana's Installment Sales Act could be emasculated by removal
of dealer participation control.71
In contemplating unreasonable demands by finance companies for
an increased allowable finance charge, it must be remembered that, while
attributing too much prudence and frugality to the installment buyer may
be a mistake, the finance companies realize that eventually a point will
be reached at which the buyer becomes cognizant of mistreatment and
retreats for cover behind the protective doors of the commercial bank.72
In recent years banks have become powerful competitors of sales finance
companies. 73 Not only have they gained ground upon finance companies
in volume of installment sales contracts purchased, 4 but from 1942 to
1947 the volume of installment loans extended by banks was larger
than the total amount of installment sales credit extended to buyers. 75
Since the Big Three are aware of this source of danger to their business,
a plausible assumption is that the large companies will attempt to main-
tain their charges at "bank rates" or thereabout. 76 And, if the small
companies raise their charges, they stand to lose much dealer business.
71. The dealer participation provision has been declared unconstitutional. Without
the maximum finance charge, the statute, for all practical purposes, becomes merely a
disclosure-type statute with anti-trust provisions. The legislative intent seemingly will
have been frustrated.
72. As recently as 1935, the consumer's ignorance made him the whipping-boy for
both dealer and finance company. The situation that existed seemed to he "[e]veryone
for himself and the Devil take the hindmost," the consumer of course being the "hind-
most." WISCONSIN INTERIM REPORT 35; see also Mors, supra note 37, at 201-2. The
situation has changed since that time. Bank advertising, disclosure statutes, uniformity
of contract provisions, the "6% Plan," and a general increase in the education of install-
ment buyers has made them wary of finance charge abuses. See PLUMMER AND YOUNG,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 261. Evidence of the rapid growth of installment lending of
money indicates that the consumer will no longer accept high finance charges attached
to an installment sale. See note 18 supra.
73. Proof that finance companies recognize and fear bank competition is offered
by the companies themselves, in their attempts to augment their reputation at the expense
of the banks. CCC, for example, in its publications, makes subtle but continued refer-
ences to banks' refusals to enter the field of consumer credit early in the century, while
finance companies were more than willing to help finance the consumer's needs. See
PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 33-45. Again, in pointing out the financial stability
of sales finance companies, Mr. Phelps, quoting an unidentified authority, says: "'It
has been said that during the depression many finance companies lost money through
bank failures but no bank lost money through finance company failures.'" Id. at 66.
Anomalously, while finance companies attempt to discredit banks, they have tried to
associate themselves with the prestige of banking houses. "It is as a banking house
serving its community in the best traditional sense that Commercial Credit Company
has had its great success." LILLY, HELPING AmEIECA Buy WHAT IT WAN s 45 (1952),
published by and supplied to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL by Commercial Credit Com-
pany, Baltimore, Md.
74. See note 17 supra.
75. Cox, op. cit. supra note 17, at 489, Table B-3.
76. ". . . The sales finance company differs from . . . other finance companies
... in its lower rates of charge, which in the purchasing of retail paper are competitive
NOTES
Assumptions must be made and their probable effects considered,
and the conflicting evidence must be weighed carefully before it is
possible to determine whether or not to regulate the installment sales
finance industry. The Indiana Supreme Court felt that regulation of
dealer participation was unnecessary. t In 1935 the Indiana Legislature
decided that such a limitation was essential ;7B the legislative attitude
apparently has not changed. At the session immediately following the
Holt decision, the General Assembly enacted a statute patently directed
at monopolistic practices but with the express purpose of controlling
dealer participation.7 9 No attempt was made to conceal the fact that this
new act is merely a substitute for the invalid Section 10.80
Was the change in tenor of dealer participation regulation from a
direct attempt to hold finance charges at a minimum to an anti-monopoly
measure justified? In the interim between the Holt case and the passage
of the new act, several complaints were lodged with the Department of
with the 'low bank rates' advertised by commercial banks." PHELps, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 47.
77. Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. 1952).
78. IND. ANN. STAr. § 58-910 (Burns 1951).
79. The purpose of House Enrolled Act No. 430, 1953, is stated in § 3 of the
Act: "It is declared illegal for any licensee under the provisions of the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act to enter into any contract, agreement or arrangement with any person,
firm or corporation, or to engage in any practice which would tend to lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in such business field."
Political pressures played a large part in the passage of this act. One newspaper
correspondent describes the fight over the bill thusly: "I became intrigued by this
behind-the-scenes battle in the legislature because it represented a situation where two
business groups were battling without, seemingly, the general public interest being
immediately involved. . . . So here was a situation where the big money lenders and
the smaller money lenders were embattled ...
"That a real battle was on was apparent when the bill failed three times to win
House passage by a constitutional majority-but finally squeaked by on a fourth try.
[I]n the Senate, where the bill passed easily, [one senator], speaking in support,
said the issue simply was the protection of Indiana finance companies against the large,
widely operating companies.
"So far as I am aware no lobbyists registered to battle for the small finance com-
panies. However, some important leaders in the finance and small loan field are being
credited in rumor with having operated rather diligently as lobbyists without official
portfolio for the bill. It also seems to be pretty generally accepted by some well-informed
people ... that the car dealers sat in the game when it became apparent their enlightened
self-interest was involved." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from A.
Brown Ransdell, Indianapolis Correspondent for the Louisville Courier-Journal.
80. Although the Department of Financial Institutions intends to limit dealer
participation through the new act, its method is as yet undetermined. "... [W]e have
no definite program pertaining to dealer participation ....
"... [T]he industry will probably set the rate .. . and . ..we may decide that
the prevailing rate established by the industry should be a proper basis for all con-
cerned .... [The feeling in the Department is that] the practice of paying dealer par-
ticipation in excess of the prevailing rate would have a tendency to lessen competition."
Communication to the INDIANA LAW JoURxAL from Joseph McCord, Director, Depart-
ment of Financial Institutions.
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Financial Institutions by small companies which had begun to experience
a loss of business to out-of-state firms. 81 Although the nationals prob-
ably anticipated the introduction of new anti-dealer participation measures
and so withheld any extensive program of raising rebates, in some
instances they had elevated the kickbacks to certain dealers with a
resultant decrease in the locals' business.8 2 In light of Indiana's recent
enactment, a consideration of the necessity and propriety of dealer
participation regulation to prevent threats of monopoly is in order.
The apprehension of the small companies which prompted the new
Indiana statute may well be justified.8 3 Many reasons can be advanced
to explain the small companies' fear of kickback competition with the
nationals. The locals must maintain low finance charges to secure dealer
business. Therefore, the larger the participation they must allow, the
smaller their return. All evidence points to the fact that the nationals
are financially better able to accept a smaller return upon each transaction
than are the small companies.8 4 The very fact that the members of the
Big Three have always maintained lower rates than the locals creates
an inference of their financial superiority.85 The large companies received
their impetus for growth from manufacturer relationships, and with
expansion came the desire for the safety and increased earnings accruing
from diversification." CIT and CCC have entered such related fields as
accounts receivable financing, factoring, and, of course, insurance, as
well as acquiring outright ownership of certain manufacturing com-
panies.87 Furthermore, simple administrative expenses, such as advertis-
ing and printing, can be shared by numerous branch offices, 8 whereas a
local firm usually has but one office.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Dire results have been predicted for small companies, in the absence of dealer
participation regulation. ". . . [T]he local and independent finance companies will, in:
all probability, be forcd out of business for lack of clientele. They will be unable to
pay the higher dealer participation under the prevailing rates for installment financing."
Ibid.
"... With money costs increasing and the tremendous increase in operating expenses,
the small company will have to close its doors as it will not be profitable for it to
operate and give the major portion of the finance charge . . . back to the dealer."
Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from John F. Doyle, Supervisor, Division
of Consumer Credit, Wisconsin State Banking Department.
84. See note 66 supra.
85. See note 44 supra.
86. With the imposition of Regulation W, which tightened up installment credit
terms, the volume of installment sales credit decreased. In 1946, most of CCC's profit
resulted from its participation in industries other than sales credit. GMAC that same
year lost more than four million dollars due to its lack of diversification. C.I.T., For-
tune, Sept., 1947, p. 87, col. 2.
87. See note 46 supra.
88. CCC, for example, maintains more than .300 -5gIq finance offices located in
NOTES
The nationals' pecuniary advantages may operate in many ways
to improve their competitive position to the detriment of the small
companies. Ordinarily, finance companies rebate a fixed percentage of
the unpaid time balance to dealers.89 However, evidence of the competi-
tive situation in Pennsylvania, where only the finance charge is limited,
indicates that, in a market where companies are heatedly vying for
dealer business, these companies may cease to state a definite percentage,
but rather will quote a net rate to the dealer, allow him to tailor the total
charge on each sale to suit the individual buyer, and pocket any amount
be receives above the net rate.90 Where this practice prevails, the'big
companies have made large gains; reportedly many small companies
have been absorbed by larger companies, have left sales financing and
entered other phases of credit, have had to exist on substandard risk
paper, or have failed completely."' Finance charges supposedly have
risen to the maximum and the small companies have not been able to
quote as low a net rate as the nationals. 92 It is not unlikely, then, that
regulation of the finance charge in absence of dealer participation limits
can prove an almost outright grant of dealer business to the large com-
panies.
But the nationals, with their low-charge policy, seem more likely
to select an alternate mode of competing-one which would allow them
to offer a total charge to the public lower than the small companies can,
while at the same time rebating larger amounts to the dealer. Taking
advantage of their geographical dispersion, they can afford to take losses
46 states. PHELPs, op. cit. sopra note 15, at 87. Both CIT and GMAC are dispersed
similarly.
89. The dealer's reserve, the rebate, and the bonus are stated percentages. Only
the pack is not a predetermined percentage of the unpaid balance. WiscoNsiN INTERIjj
REPoRT 34-38.
90. ". . . [O]ne of the main purposes of the legislation in this state was never
accomplished because our law makes no reference to dealers reserves or kickbacks.
This has created a situation whereby the financial institutions are still paying substan-
tial kickbacks to dealers at the expense of the consumer. Reserves as high as 5%- and
6% . . . are being paid to the dealer. The consumer pays the full legal rate--6%, 9%
and 12% discount depending on the age of the car.
"Many of the larger financial institutions have established a flat rate of 3%, 4%
and 5% to the dealer. The difference is pocketed by the dealer. There is no legal pro-
tection of any kind for the consumer." Communication to William L. Schloss, President,
Indianapolis Morris Plan Bank, from Cyrus S. Gorson, President, Philadelphia Auto:
mobile Finance Association, and supplied to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL by Mr. Schloss.
91. "Actually these large organizations have been able to offer to the better and
more substantial dealer kickback propositions which the local independent companies
could not meet and continue in business. They were left with the alternative of doing
business with the second rate dealers or handling sub-standard risks.
"Many of these companies have discontinued their automobile finance business and
are concentrating on personal loans, home improvement loans, appliances, etc...." Ibid.
92. Ibid.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in any one area long enough to woo all desirable business, to the exclusion
of the small companies, either recouping their losses in other areas or
allowing their tremendous volume to absorb the loss.
As previously indicated, small finance companies have three methods
of enticing dealers.. These firms must offer participation at least equal
to that granted by their larger competitors. It is entirely possible that
the small companies may not be able to survive by offering the same
types and quantities of services and receiving a smaller share of the
finance charge. In order to reduce expenses so that they may compete
with rebates, they will, of necessity, change one of their other dealer-lures.
Finance charges apparently cannot be increased any appreciable extent
without a loss of business. Therefore, the first move of a small company
may be to reduce its risk of loss by raising its credit standards; it may
not accept contracts of persons whom investigation shows to be sub-
standard risks. If the dealer, under these circumstances, were to continue
selling his paper to that company, those members of the public who
were refused credit would have suffered immeasurably. The dealer
will more than likely transfer his business to a larger firm--one which
can offer large kickbacks, maintain the same services, and continue to
extend liberal credit, without increasing finance charges. Small companies,
after much experimentation with the various dealer lures, will realize
that, in order to retain or secure dealer business, dealer participation
remains the piece de r6sistance.
If locals are not able to compete individually with the Big Three,
cooperative efforts may be attempted. But fewer weapons are available
for organized efforts in this industry than in others. There is no way
for small companies to combine for cooperative buying, because there is
nothing to buy.93 They could pool investigation services, perhaps even
cooperatively maintain a credit and collection bureau, but the saving
would be negligible. They could team capital to borrow at lower rates
by floating larger loans, but it is doubtful that small companies united
within one geographical area could borrow quantities large enough to
render an appreciable saving.94
93. In the food distribution industry, to combat the chain-store influence, small
grocers have formed "voluntary" chains, which are ". . . group[s] of retail grocers in
a wholesaler's territory who voluntarily affiliate themselves with him while preserving
their individual ownership. . . ." In this way the corner grocer is able to make a saving
comparable to one made by a chain owning its own warehouses. Fulda, Food Ditribu-
tion in the United States, The Struggle Between Independents and Chains, 99 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 1051, 1061 (1951).
94. Cost of borrowing is a larger part of total operating expense for the local than
for the national. In 1937, for example, this cost to the small companies amounted to
15% of gross income, while for the nationals, cost of borrowing was only 10% of gross
income. PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 249, Table 63. This means that
NOTES
Despite the apparent economic advantages held by the large com-
panies, a bare possibility of oligopoly in the sales financing industry
exists; oligopoly certainly is not imminent. The very nature of credit
makes difficult the acquisition of a monopoly in the financing of sales
of a particular make of automobile. Credit being an amorphous sub-
stance, with any one segment of it homologous to any other, it is a product
which is not associated with trade names; like the grain sold by farmers,
it is fungible and homogeneous. Although the Big Three, through ex-
tensive advertising, has attempted to brand-name the credit extended
by them, few consumers would knowingly and willingly pay more money
to deal with GMAC than a commercial bank. The very presence of
many small finance companies indicates that competition with the big
firms is possible. Furthermore, the deep inroads which commercial banks
have made into the business of sales finance companies, large and small,
illuminate the possibilities of growth of any small company, and tend
to dispel the idea that the large companies can increase their volume at
will.
Were an oligopoly to develop, numerous benefits may accrue to the
public. The Big Three has been instrumental in disinfecting the entire
industry of many abusive practices. Partially because of the nationals,
the average finance charge has been maintained at a reasonable level.
Their policies toward public education have made consumers alert to
mistreatment and conscious of fair treatment. But, given an oligopo-
listic situation, it is readily foreseen that the members of the Big Three
may feud within their exclusive Utopia. A plausible first move by one
of these companies would be an increase in dealer participation coupled
with a decrease in finance charges, but a likely eventuality in this battle
of the behemoths is that, amid their thrashings, consumers' interests
would be crushed underfoot. Finance charges conceivably could rise
at a rate comparable to the increase in dealer participation. However,
the loss of consumer business to banks via the installment loan should
prove an effective brake upon rising finance charges.
If impartial analysis discloses threats of monopoly which compe-
tition has failed to check, it may be necessary for governmental forces
to intervene. Is state regulation of the single element of dealer partici-
pation an adequate method of combatting monopoly? GMAC has suc-
ceeded in procuring a. large percentage of GM dealer paper without
entering into participation competition. Presumably the other two large
companies could conduct their business in a fashion comparable to
in order for the small companies to borrow at rates comparable to those received by
the nationals, banks which usually supply the funds for finance company activities would
have to reduce their rates 33.3%, an extremely large reduction.
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GMAC. State anti-trust statutes may be considered, although applica-
tion of these statutes in the past has been ineffective. 5
Certainly the federal government, armed with many anti-trust
weapons, has the authority to prevent monopoly. The government can
invoke the Sherman Act in any instance of a firm monopolizing or
attempting to monopolize an area.96 The Robinson-Patman Act can
be used against firms discriminating in price.9 7 The Clayton Act stands
ready for use against practices which may tend to lessen competition
or to create a monopoly. 98 But federal action is often slow and burden-
some, as is evidenced by the suit against GM for coercive practices,
which originated with indictments in 1938, and after much litigation,
resulted in a consent decree in 1952.99
The existence of a variety of statutory schemes for regulating
retail installment sales financing among states which have some type
of regulation, the paucity of accurate evidence as to the effect of the
plans adopted, and the laissez faire attitude of most states, illuminates
the pressing need for a systematic and detailed study of the industry.
Sijice that data which is available shows that the installment finance
95. Many factors have caused state anti-trust laws to fall into disuse, including
expansion of. the concept of interstate commerce, thereby broadening the application of
federal anti-trust laws, expense and time involved in anti-trust prosecution, and. diffi-
culty of obtaining evidence. The impression received upon examination of previous use
of state anti-trust statutes is that "these laws raise more smoke than fire." Legis.,
32 COL. L. REv. 347, 364 (1932). See also Comment, 43 ILL. L. REV. 205 (1948.), which
discusses the inactive status of Illinois anti-trust legislation.
96. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 'as imetided, 15 U.S.C. §2 (1946).
97. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. J§ 13, 13a (1946).
98. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946).
99. The Federal Trade Commission recently entered the area of automobile sales
financing "with the promulgation of its Auto Pack rules, which impose contract dis-
closure requirements upon auto retailers. 'TADE PcT-icE RuLEs RELATING To THE
RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALE AND FINANCING OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 16 FE. REG. 1059
(1951). The ultimate objective of these regulations is to protect the installment buyer
from unfair or deceptive practices in the sale. of motor vehicles.
These rules are intended to serve as a guide for the industry; without state and
private cooperation they will not necessarily eliminate abuses. "Compliance with these
rules is expected to be widespread and to the greatest possible extent on a voluntary
basis of cooperative effort and not by 'policing.... ." From a summary of an informal
opinion expressed by PGad B. Morehouse, Chief, Trade Practice Conference Division,
and Assistant Director, Bureau of Industry Cooperation, Federal Trade Commission
in FTC ".uto Pack Rules Interpreted, 5 QuARTEaRy REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
PERSONAL FINANCE LA w 35 (Spring 1951).
The Chairman of the Commission openly encourages the states to promulgate con-
trol. also. "When instances of 'probable violation are brought to the attention of the I
Commission in respect of which the requisites of commerce and public interest appear
to be present and to which the Federal Trade Commission Act is applicable, reference
for-state-attention shall be made when the state in which the transaction occurs has
legislation applicable to the practices and when, in the opinion of the Commission, such
legislatioh'is adequate and is being enforceed by the state. . . ." From an opinion
expressed by William A. Ayres, Actifig Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, ibid.
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picture differs from state to state or area to area, perhaps the inquiry
should be conducted by state commissions rather than a federal agency.
Even if there is a need, as some writers have suggested, 100 for a uniform
consumer credit code embracing iot only installment sales financing, but
all forms of credit extended to consumers, research prior to drafting
such a code should elicit the peculiarities in the conditions' in each statd.
In contemplating regulation, various factors must be recognized
and considered. The legislative process must resist political pressure from
groups active in the industry, who may obscure the welfare of the con-
sumer in the shadow of their interests. At the outset, a basic approach
must be determined-that is, whether the consumer is most benefited
by legislation dealing with matters affecting him directly'or by legisla'-
tion attacking monopolistic practices and promoting competition. The'
latter tack probably will be 'advantageous to the small finance companies
as well as the consumer-
Some features of present legislation seem almost essential to suc-
cessful regulation of installment sales financing. Nobody will object
to disclosure requirements which will enable *consumers to be informed
of contract terms; these requirements should include disclosure of in-
surance rates and coverage and a uniform method of setting 'forth the.
finance charge. And little difficulty should arise from 'an attempt .to.
limit the allowable finance charge. But the Holt case' f6rewarfis that
there may be obstacles in the path of dealer participation control. The
situation, in Indiana suggests the necessity of establishing a maximum'
dealer participation. The Michigan statute, which limits the kickback
to the dealer to compensation for services rendered, appears to 'embody
the most just and reasonable approach. It would be premature to eval-
uate the effectiveness of the new Indiana act, which is couched !in anti-
monopoly language. Whatever type regulation is chosen, its effectua-
tion by an administrative agency would provide desirable flexibility'
which cannot be achieved by rigid statutory rates and rules, of practice.
Thorough consideration of all relevant factors should result in legisla-
tion bringing order out of chaos.
100. "... [I]t seems inevitable that our legislative processes will continue to,
work toward the imposition of a systematic plan of regulation covering all consumer'
installment credit agencies in a manner which holds them to uniform standards of con-,
duct consistent with the public interest. . . ." Hubachek, The Drift Toward a Con-"
sumer Credit Code, 16 U. OF CHI. L. TRv. 609, 634 (1949).
